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China Men, United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
and the Question of Citizenship
I.
The middle chapter of Maxine Hang Kingston 's China Men is
called "The Laws. 11 Summarizing legislation and court decisions
that have affected those of Chinese descent living in the United
States, it complicates the already complicated effort to determine
the genre of a book that self-consciously resists pre-set
categories. Narrated by a Chinese-American woman who succeeds in
simultaneously honoring her male ancestors and challenging their
patriarchal customs, China Men celebrates their imaginative and
physical efforts to establish and transform a new horne despite
resistance to their presence. Part autobiography, part retold and
altered Chinese legends and European novels, such as Robinson
Crusoe, the book also turns out to be a chronicle of legal history.
Not knowing quite what to do with Kingston's second book, the
publishers label it "Nonfiction/Literature. 11 One blurb on the
paperback cover calls it "a history," while another says that it
consists of "myths and stories." This defiance of easy generic
classification is appropriate for a book about a narrator's effort
to understand how people from a country whose name evokes the
notion of "center" landed "in a country where [they] are eccentric
people."l Kingston's placement of her chapter on the laws at the
formal center of her book should also remind those in the field of
literary studies intent on "political" criticism about the need to
pay careful attention to legal history.
According to Catherine Gallagher, by turning to the "micro-
2politics of daily Iife ll such criticism has "displaced or
supplemented il traditional "important economic and political agents
and events" with "people and phenomena that once seemed wholly
insignificant, indeed outside of history: women, criminals, the
insane, sexual practices, and discourses, fairs, festivals, plays
of all kinds. 112 Kingston's bizarre story of an lIeccentric ll people
in the Uni ted States might seem a Iiterary example of the sort of
criticism that Gallagher advocates, since even though she places
"The Laws" in the middle of her book, she makes clear from what
surrounds the chapter that a summary of the most traditional of
political events cannot possibly give an adequate account of the
experience of those of Chinese ancestry in the United States.
But if Kingston dramatizes the need to "supplement"
traditional economic and political analysis with what one of the
book's blurb's calls "the lode of a culture's deepest realities, "
the central Iocation of "The Laws ll suggests that to "displace" such
analysis is to risk providing inadequate descriptions of the
"micro-politics of daily life." As Kingston makes clear, laws may
not completely determine the shape of people's lives, but they do
affect how they can be fashioned. Citizenship laws are a case in
point. Unfortunately, however, when those following "the new
direction being taken in American literary studies" turn their
attention to questions of citizenship, they rarely pay attention to
legal definitions, and when they do they almost always emphasize
the law's power to repress. 3 Kingston also calls attention to a
history of legal repression by listing various Chinese exclusion
3acts. But she also lists positive examples. In doing so she
honors the imaginative efforts of Chinese immigrants who learned
quickly how to appropriate the American legal system to their
advantage. 4 For instance, under the year 1898 she notes: "Another
victory. The Supreme Court decision in The United States v. Wong
Kim Ark stated that a person born in the Uni ted States to Chinese
parents is an American. The decision has never been reversed or
changed, and it is the law on which most Americans of Chinese
ancestry base their citizenship today" (CM 155-56) .5
In this essay I will analyze both this 1898 Supreme Court case
and Kingston's 1980 work of the literary imagination. By bringing
legal and literary analysis together, I hope to offer an
understanding of a potential within Uni ted States citizenship that
we would not get if they were kept apart. I will start with Wong
Kim Ark and end with China Men, since Kingston's vision of
citizenship is in part dependent upon conditions made possible by
the legal case. But only in part, because, as important as the
results of Wong Kim Ark are, they are limited. No formal legal
definition can ultimately determine what the nature of citizen
participation in civic life will be. Obviously, works of the
imagination, like Kingston's, cannot either. But they can, more
extensively than the law, provide avision of what constitutes
active citizenship.
To be sure, laws, such as those concerned with voting rights,
can enhance possibilities for active participation. Furthermore,
almost every court decision concerning citizenship implies at least
4a minimal vision of what it entails, including Wong Kim Ark, which
refuses to base citizenship by birth on racial descent. The case
also makes clearer the relation between subjects and citizens in
modern democracies, a relation that I will explore before turning
to China Men. Even so, the case's vision of citizenship can be
developed in a variety of ways. 1f, as Gary Jacobsohn has argued
"American citizenship is a source of identity as weIl as rights, "
we need to distinguish between the different sorts of identity that
it can suggest. 6 The importance of China Men lies in the
particular identity that its thematic and formal treatment of
citizenship implies. What distinguishes Kingston's treatment is
her way of imagining a continually reconstructed sense of "We, the
People," through adynamie interaction among citizens that
acknowledges the importance of one's ethnic heritage without
concluding that it ultimately determines one's identity.
1nsofar as politics is, as Aristotle called it, the art of the
possible, such imaginative visions havea crucial role to play in
political criticism. But because those visions are just that--
imaginative--traditional political analysis, including legal
analysis of particular cases, continues to have an important role
as well. 7 Unfortunately, many recent critics who evoke citizenship
in literary studies neglect both concrete political analysis and
imaginative vision. Instead, they devote their primary energy to
demonstrating how claims about democratic citizenship are
ideological tools in service of a repressive state. Much of this
criticism depends on the conflation of political and psychological
5subjection most powerfully articulated by Louis Althusser.
II.
In "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards
an Investigation)" Althusser claims to describe the structural
conditions in which "ideology hails or interpellates individuals as
subjects,1I conditions IImaking it clear that individuals are always-
already interpellated by ideology as subjects, which necessarily
leads to one last proposition: individuals are always-already
subjects. 1I8 Locating ideology in the material practices of
institutions like the family, the church, the educational system,
and cultural discourses, Althusser stresses both the irnportance of
psychological studies of subject formation for political analysis
and the need to take cultural and political forces into account in
any discussion of the individual subject. He also challenges the
commonly held belief that political suppression results from
governments employing an elaborate system of controls to repress
individual subjects who ideally inhabit arealm free from ideology.
Instead, for hirn the construction of individual subjectivity is
possible only within ideology.
The irnpossibility of escaping ideology leads Althusser to his
most polemical announcement: "ideology has no history . 119 His point
is not that individual ideologies lack a historYi it is instead
that political systems escape ideology no more successfully than
individuals. Althusser's insistence that ideology lacks history
helps to explain what would seem to be a curious omission by a
Frenchman writing on political subjectivity. Simon Schama has
6argued that the one indisputable story of the French Revolution is
the creation of the juridical entity of the citizen. 10 Althusser,
however, makes no effort to distinguish how subjects of a monarch
might differ from citizens in a republic. In fact, the one time in
the essay that he mentions citizens he places the word in quotation
marks. But the reason for this neglect is clear: citizens might
claim to be different from traditional subjects, but they too are
ideological subjects. Indeed, Althusser' s theory of interpellation
suggests that the most effective forms of ideology are those in
which subjects consent to the very terms of their subjection.
Made in the Cold War, Althusser's claim that "ideology has no
history" helped to demystify celebrations in the West about the
"freedom" of its citizens. In that context--and still today--it is
important to point out that democratic citizens are also subjects
within ideology. But doing'so is only part of our task. We also
need to distinguish among the individual histories of particular
ideologies and delineate the limitations and possibilities of
subjects under particular systems. Subjects may be constructed
within ideology, but not all ideologies are the same. Those
working wi thin an Al thusserian framework need to remember that
Althusser articulates an ideology with a history of its own.
Althusser's limits are especially significant in a post-Cold
War world in which people proclaim the end of history by effacing
crucial differences among political systems. Thus it is no
accident that Etienne Balibar, Althusser' s former collaborator, has
recently addressed the question of citizenship. As if responding
7to his former colleague, Balibar answers the question, "What Comes
After the Subject?" with "the citizen." Dating that succession at
1 789, he insists that any history of the relationship between
political and psychological subjects take into account the
historical importance of citizenship since the French Revolution.
This citizenship, he claims, "is not one among other attributes of
subjectivity, on the contrary: it is subjectivity, that form of
subjectivity that would no longer be identical with subjection for
anyone. ,,11 Balibar knows that this dream of pure emancipation is
impossible i nonetheless, the concept is important because it opens
up new possibilities for subjectivity.
Althusser' s instructive example of linking political and
psychological subjects has had the damaging effect of encouraging
others to turn linkages into a condition of identity. The
political helps to determine how psychological subjects are formed,
but i t does completely control them. The dream of such total
control is, of course, totalitarianism. As events one hundred
years after the French Revolution indicated, resistance to that
dream comes, not from subjectivities formed in an asocial realm,
but from those formed in civil societYi that is, the space of human
associations, such as family, church, and neighborhood groups,
between the state and the individual. Of course, for Althusser all
such associations are part of the state's ideological apparatus.
But this totalizing move indicates how much his theory suffers from
ignoring the way in which modern democracies define citizenship in
order to allow people to develop subjectivities in civil society.
8A great strength of the turn to the "micro-politics of daily
life" is that it focusses attention on the civil sphere. But to
call that sphere political is to risk effacing categories that,
even though linked, need to be distinguished from one another. For
instance, too little attention has been paid to how the
traditionally political can foster possibilities within civil
society. Laws do not only restrict i they can also generate
possibilities. As Hannah Arendt notes, "to abolish the fences of
laws between men--as tyranny does--means to take away man's
liberties and destroy freedom as a living political realitYi for
the space between men as it is hedged in by laws, is the living
space of freedom. 1112
According to Peter Riesenberg the concept of citizenship has
proved so durable "because it has been viewed not only as an
instrument useful in controlling the passions and attenuating
private concerns, but also as a means weIl suited to draw out the
best in people. 1113 This aspect of citizenship explains why it
appeals to people seeking to combat the consumer-driven
individualism that dominates American society today. To demystify
the notion of citizenship is to risk losing as a possible political
weapon a concept that imagines self fulfillment through commitment
to the public good, avision of the public good that when defined
in the civil sphere serves, according to Balibar, as a way for
citizens far removed from direct political governance to constrain,
repress, or supervise the apparatuses of state power. 14
My point is not to celebrate citizenship uncritically. If the
9modern concept of democratic citizenship opens up possibilities for
subjectivity, it does not escape contradictions. For instance,
citizenship seems to draw out the good in some only by excluding
others. Indeed, Riesenberg notes that one of the "principal
functions ll of citizenship "has been as an agent or principle of
exclusion. It has encompassed and defined privilege and
constituted the means to discriminate against non-citizens. 1I1S In
China Men, for example, proof that the narrator's family has been
accepted as fullfledged Arnerican citizens comes when a brother
clears military security to join the Navy in the Vietnam War. "The
government was certifying that the family was really American, not
precariously American, but super-Arnerican, extraordinarily secure--
Q clearance Americans ll (CM 299). A Chinese-American family is
accepted into the national community only when that community
defines itself against another during war.
It is precisely this exclusive tendency within the concept of
citizenship that makes United States v. Wong Kim Ark so important.
Not because it made United States citizenship universally
inclusive--no notion of national citizenship could do that--but
because it denied a racial determination of citizenship by birth.
III.
In 1873 Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco of Chinese
parents. In 1890 his parents moved back to China, and Wong Kim Ark
visited them, returning to San Francisco on July 26, 1890. In 1894
he again visited China. Returning in August 1895, he was denied
entrance by the United States government under existing Chinese
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exclusion acts.
An exclusion act was in force in 1890. But in 1890 the San
Francisco customs officer considered Wong Kim Ark a native-born
citizen of the United States; the 1895 officer did not. One reason
for this change was a new federal administration. In 1892 the
Democrat Grover Cleveland had been elected President. His support
in California depended upon Representative Geary, who earlier in
the year had sponsored an act that both extended the first
exclusion act of 1882 and added some harsher measures. Geary's
justification of his bill neatly demonstrates the xenophobie
tendencies that defenses of citizenship can unleash. "Because the
first duty of governments is to their own citizens, and securing to
them protection and enjoyment of their life and liberty," he
declared, "the consideration of the effect on other people is not
of consequence. ,,16 The Cleveland administration tacitly agreed
when it ruled that someone of Chinese parents born in the Uni ted
States was a subject of China, not a citizen of the United States.
In contrast, Wong Kim Ark claimed that he was a citizen by birth
under the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The case received wide attention in law journals .17
Eventually it came before the Supreme Court, and in 1898 the Court
in a 6 to 2 decision ruled in his favor. 18 The decision turned on
interpretations of the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which reads: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
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reside." This clause was necessitated by Justice Taney's infamous
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) that placed the power of
the federal government squarely behind the institution of slavery.
In the case Scott, a slave, argued that he had become free when his
master took hirn into a free territory. One issue facing the Court
was whether Scott had the right to bring suit, a right often
reserved for citizens . As a result, Taney made some of the Supreme
Court's first rulings on citizenship, a concept contained in the
Constitution, but not defined.
Working within what sounds like an egalitarian framework,
Taney argued that "The words 'people of the United States,' and
'citizens,, are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They
both describe the political body, who, according to our republican
institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and
conduct the government through their representatives. They are
what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen
is one of this people, and a constituent member of this
sovereignty." 1 9 But if Taney' s definition confirmed the republican
belief that the sovereign body of the people consists of only one
class of citizens, he used it to deny citizenship to free blacks as
weIl as slaves. Since there is only one class of citizens, he
argued, the "deep and enduring marks of inferiority and
degradation" implanted on blacks excluded them from the community
that originally constituted the sovereign people of the nation. 20
The citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is clearly
designed to nullify Taney's ruling. Since almost all of African
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descent alive in 1868 had been born in the United States, the
clause guarantees them both United States and state citizenship.
The possibility of citizenship for those few not born in the Uni ted
States was opened up in 1870 when Congress passed a new
naturalization act. In 1790 Congress's first naturalization act
restricted the right of naturalization to "any alien, being a free
white person. ,,21 Although the act was modified at various times,
that language remained. But in 1870 the right was extended to
"aliens of African nativity, and to persons of African descent.,,22
The 1870 act did not, however, open up naturalization to those
of Asian descent. On the contrary, by 1882 Chinese, with a few
exceptions, were forbidden from even entering the country.
Nonetheless, the Fourteenth Amendment would still seem to guarantee
citizenship to anyone of Chinese descent born in the United States.
But the government's challenge to Wong Kim Ark's claim to
citizenship indicates that the guarantee was not so certain. The
controversy focused on the phrase "subj ect to the j urisdiction
thereof." Was jurisdiction territorial or national?
Wong Kim Ark claimed that it was territorial, that anyone
within the territorial limits of the United States is subject to
its jurisdiction. If that were the case, the government responded,
the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" would be
unnecessary, since it would mean the same thing as "born or
naturalized in the United States. 1I Instead, the phrase should be
defined nationally, since evenwhen citizens or subj ects of a
country are outside of its territorial limits they are still
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subject to its jurisdiction. Indeed, when a United States couple
outside the country gives birth to a child, the child is a United
States citizen because it, like its parents, is assumed to be under
United States jurisdiction. Similarly, the argument ran, when a
child of Chinese parents was born in the United States it, like its
parents, was deemed subject to Chinese jurisdiction and thus was
born a Chinese subject. The issue facing the Court was, in other
words: does the United States determine citizenship by birth
according to jus soli (by soil) or jus sanguinis (by blood)?
Thirty years after the amendment's enactment the Court finally had
to rule on how to interpret one of its crucial phrases.
The argument for granting Wong Kim Ark citizenship insisted
that the United States had simply taken over the common law
doctrine that all people born in the king's realm are subjects of
the king. Writing for the six-judge majority, Justice Gray began
by noting that the Constitution uses the terms "citizen of the
United States" and "natural-born citizen of the United States," but
does not define them. As a result, following the Court in Minor v.
Happersett (1875), he turned to the common law. Operating
according to jus soli, English common law declared that all
children born within the king's realm were subjects of the king
except those born of foreign ambassadors or of alien enemies
occupying part of the king's dominions, since such children could
not be said to be "born within the allegiance, the obedience, or
the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the
jurisdiction of the King" (WKA 655). Common law doctrine, Gray
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asserted, was simply adopted by the Uni ted States. The Fourteenth
Amendment did not change that situation; it merely reaffirmed it in
such a way as to overturn Taney's Dred Scott ruling that limited
United States citizenship to whites. The phrase "subject to the
jurisdiction thereof" was included for two reasons. First, it
emphasized the common law exceptions of children of ambassadors and
occupying armies. Second, it excluded "children of members of the
Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National
Government, unknown to the common law" (WKA 682). The latter was
ruled upon by the Court in Elk v. Wilkins (1884), the first case
that substantively interpreted the phrase in question.
The case resulted when John Elk, an American Indian, renounced
his tribaI loyalty and claimed American citizenship under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for a seven to two majority, Justice
Gray denied his claim, arguing that although loyal members of
Indian tribes are in a 11 geographical sense born in the Uni ted
States," theyare "no more 'born in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof,' within the meaning of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than the children of subjects
of any foreign government born within the domain of that
government, or the children born within the United States, of
ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations. ,,23 As
a result, even though Elk had renounced his tribaI loyalty, he
could not claim automatic citizenship at birth. The only way for
hirn to become a citizen, therefore, was through naturalization.
But American Indians were a special case. 24 To confirm his
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argument that the phrase "subj ect to the j urisdiction thereof"
should be read territorially, Gray pointed to the final clause of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment: the equal protection clause,
which states that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." "It is
impossible, 11 Gray wrote, "to construe the words 'subj ect to the
jurisdiction thereof, , in the opening sentence as less
comprehensive than the words 'within its jurisdiction,' in the
concluding sentence of the same section: or to hold that persons
'within the jurisdiction' of one of the States of the Union are not
'subject to the jurisdiction of the United States'" (WKA 687).
Concluding his argument for a territorial interpretation, Gray
contended that an interpretation excluding children born to aliens
within the Uni ted States from the jurisdiction of the Uni ted States
would "deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch,
Irish, German, or other European parentage, who have always been
considered and treated as citizens of the Uni ted States" (WKA 694) .
The only remaining question for the Court to decide, he
declared, was whether the citizenship clause applied to Chinese as
weIl. Citing a number of Supreme Court cases involving Chinese, he
concluded that 11 Chinese persons born out of the Uni ted States,
remaining subjects of the Emperor of China, and not having become
citizens of the United States, are entitled to the protection of
and owe allegiance to the Uni ted States, so long as they are
permitted by the United States to reside here; and are 'subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, , in the same sense as all other aliens
16
residing in the United States" (WKA 694). The fact that Congress
had passed exclusion acts and had not allowed Chinese to become
naturalized citizens did not affect the provisions concerning
citizenship by birth proclaimed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Born
in the United States, Wong Kim Ark was a natural-born citizen.
Since he had not renounced his citizenship, he remained a citizen
and should be allowed to re-enter the country.
The dissent was written by Chief Justice Fuller, joined by
Justice Harlan, who had been the lone dissenter in Plessy v.
Ferguson decided two years earlier. Harlan had also dissented when
the Court denied citizenship to John Elk. 25 Fuller took issue with
the majority's appeal to common law. Citing a number of
authorities, he showed that common law had not simply been adopted
by the United States, especially on the issue of citizenship. In
fact, he argued, the common law doctrine of jus soli was a feudal
doctrine that had no place in Arnerican law. It had "no more
survived the American Revolution than the same rule survived the
French Revolution" (WKA 710). Common law assumed a subj ect' s
indissoluble loyalty. The United States, however, was founded on
the right to al ter allegiance. Declaring their independence,
former colonial subj ects asserted their right to form a new
political entity. A country of immigration, the United States was
founded on the implicit recognition of people's right to expatriate
from their former countries. Explicitly, the United States had
acknowledged the right of expatriation in a law passed by Congress
on July 27, 1868, the same year that the Fourteenth Amendment was
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adopted. For Fuller this law marked the United States' clear break
with common law doetrine and ruled out a eommon law reading of the
amendment.
Another argument against the eommon law interpretation
depended on a distinetion between subjeets and eitizens. It was
made by George D. Collins, who along with the Solieitor General
filed the government's brief in the ease. In an 1895 law review
essay Collins pointed out that under eommon law "the question was
not what eonstituted a citizen of the nation, but what constituted
a subjeet of the king." The "subordinate status of subjeet ... ,
however appropriate to monarehy, is fundamentally repugnant to
republiean institutions . ,,26
Collins eould have reinforeed his argument by referring to
Dred Seott. In Dred Scott slaves were certainly subject to the
jurisdietion of the United States. But they were not eitizens.
Thus, even if prior to the Fourteenth Amendment the United States
had adopted eommon law, Dred Seott made elear that it did not make
all subjeets automatie eitizens. Indeed, Taney denied eitizenship,
not only to slaves, but to free blaeks by ineluding them as part of
a subj eet race. Commenting on a provision in the Artieles of
Confederation that determined eaeh state' s quota for the armed
forees in proportion to its "white inhabitants," he declared:
"Words eould hardly have been used whieh more strongly mark the
line of distinction between the eitizen and the subject--the free
and the subjugated races. ,,27 Since it was universally granted that
the purpose of Fourteenth Amendment was to overturn Dred Scott, it
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would seem to follow that in granting citizenship to blacks, the
Fourteenth Amendment broke with feudal practices of subjection,
including the common law doctrine associated with them. The
standard practice for countries to move from feudal practices to
republican ones was to determine citizenship by descent. Thus it
made perfect sense to argue that with the Fourteenth Amendment the
United States followed that practice.
Fuller found textual evidence for a jus sanguinis reading in
the 1866 Civil Rights Bill. Passed two months before the same
Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, it states: "That all
persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States" (emphasis added) .28 "The words 'not
subject to any foreign power,'" Fuller insisted, "do not in
themselves refer to mere territorial jurisdiction, for the persons
referred to are persons born in the United States. All such
persons are undoubtedly subject to the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, and yet the act concedes that nevertheless they
may be subject to the political jurisdiction of a foreign
government. In other words, by the terms of the act all persons
born in the United States, and not owing allegiance to any foreign
power, are citizens" (WKA 720). Passed in part with the intention
of guaranteeing the constitutionality of the 1866 act, the
Fourteenth Amendment carried the same meaning in the crucial phrase
of its citizenship clause.
In his law review essay Collins argued that, if the framers of
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the amendment had wanted to indicate jurisdiction territorially,
they would have written "subject to the jurisdiction of its laws, "
since clearly anyone within United States territory, except for
mutually agreed upon representatives of foreign countries , is
subject to its laws. But they had instead used a phrase that
indieated national, not terri torial, j urisdietion. 29 When they
wanted to indieate territorial jurisdietion, as in the equal
protection clause, they were perfectly capable of doing so.
To be sure, the majority elaimed that a jus sanguinis ruling
would deny citizenship to children born in this country of many
immigrant aliens. But for Fuller this argument was wrong. Elk v.
Wilkins held that the crueial phrase means "not merely subject in
some respect or degree to the jurisdietion of the United States,
but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing
them direct and immediate allegianee. ,,30 Immigrant aliens
permanently domiciled in the Uni ted States had implicitly
acknowledged a break with their horne country, so that when their
children were born they were eompletely subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States. But the situation of Chinese, Fuller argued,
was different. Forbidden by the Chinese government from
expatriation and forbidden by United States law from
naturalization, Chinese "seem in the United States to have remained
pilgrims and sojourners" (WKA 726). Since they were not completely
subject to the jurisdietion of the United States, their children
eould not become automatie citizens by birth.
Pointing to an inconsisteney in the majority' s argument,
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Fuller noted that the Court had granted the government power to
expel or deport aliens, but not citizens. To grant citizenship to
children of people forbidden from becoming citizens themselves was
to allow the government to break up families by expelling parents,
but not children. Furthermore, if the jus soli interpretation were
granted, all children born abroad of Uni ted States citizens since
1868 would be denied citizenship, since they were not born in the
United States. A jus sanguinis interpretation would account for
their citizenship because both they and their parents were still
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Despite Fuller's argument, the Court decided in favor of Wong
Kim Ark. As a result, according to an expert quoted by Gray, nThe
right of citizenship [in the United States] never descends in the
legal sense, either by the common law, or under the common
naturalization acts. Itis incident to birth in the country, or it
is given personally by statuten (WKA 665) .
But as important as the decision was and remains for a more
inclusive vision of American citizenship, it was and is limited.
A formal definition of who can be a natural born citizen does not
·provide avision of the type of civic life that a citizen will be
born into. For instance, whether a country has a jus soli or jus
sanguinis determination of citizenship has little or no effect on
how citizens interact with one another or the relation between
citizens and the political body that governs them. Another
limitation is that the Court's decision does not govern
naturalization laws, which remain in the hands of Congress. In
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many ways inclusive laws of naturalization are much more important
for guaranteeing a heterogeneous citizenry than rulings deciding
eligibility for citizenship at birth. After all, if naturalization
laws do not discriminate according to race, within a generation
children of many races will be born citizens even when a country
adheres to jus sanguinis.
But to point to these limits is not to imply that the Court's
decision in Wong Kim Ark lacks importance. Indeed, its extensive
discussion of citizenship helps place in context a number of issues
that are crucial for an understanding of Kingston 's vision of
citizenship in China Men.
IV.
One source of confusion in discussions of citizenship is the
relation between subjects and citizens. It is tempting to oppose
the two terms. The opposition between subjects and citizens is so
common that even a sophisticated theorist like Balibar adheres to
it when he argues that modern citizenship claims to be free from
subjection. In Wong Kim Ark, however, the dissenters' claim that
subjects and citizens are opposing terms was rejected by the
majority. In rejecting it, Justice Gray cited that major figure in
American legal history, Chancellor Kent, who wrote: "Subjects and
citizens are, in a degree, convertible terms as applied to natives;
and though the term citizen seems appropriate to republican
freemen, yet we are, equally with the inhabitants of all other
countries, subjects, for we are equally bound by allegiance and
subjection to the government and law of the land" (WKA 665). To be
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sure, if subjects and citizens are in certain cases convertible
terms, they are not identical. All ci tizens might be subj ects, but
not all subjects are citizens. Nonetheless, the crucial point is
that subjects and citizens are not oppositional concepts. Indeed,
the citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment underscores their
relationship when it makes citizenship a condition of subjection.
If, as Kent recognized, citizens are always already subjects,
criticism that exposes their subjection loses much of its force.
In fact, we should remember that the inclusive definition of
citizenship adopted by the Court in Nong Kim Ark depended on
establishing continuity between a rule for feudal subjects and one
for citizens in a democracy. Furthermore, Gray's first citation of
Kent on the link between subjects and citizens occurred in an essay
that he wrote as a young lawyer refuting Taney's decision in Dred
Scott. 31 Liberated from the need to demystify claims that
citizenship frees people from all forms of subjection, we are in a
better position to investigate whether citizenship in modern
democracies opens up possibilities for new and different forms of
subjectivity. To do so we need to consider one of the most
important questions of modern democratic theory: how citizens
relate to the state.
It might seem that the distinguishing feature of democratic
citizenship is a set of "nearly reciprocal obligations" with the
state. 32 But, as Hobbes's famous social contract should remind us,
reciprocity between subjects and the state exists in absolutist
forms of government as weIl as in democratic ones. Significantly,
23
Hobbes also refers to his subj ects as citizens, as does the
Renaissance theorist of French absolutism Jean Bodin, whose
subject-citizens also exchange reciprocal obligations with the
sovereign. Indeed, these reciprocal obligations mark the
difference between subj ect-citizens and mere subj ects. What "makes
a citizen," he declares, is "the mutual obligation between subject
and sovereign by which, in return for the faith and obedience
rendered to hirn, the sovereign must do justice and give counsel,
assistance, encouragement, and protection to the subject.,,33
Democracies are, therefore, not the only systems in which
subject-citizens willingly consent to the terms of their
subjection. Citizens in democracies are no different from Bodin's
subject-citizens, for instance, when it comes to exchanging loyalty
for certain guaranteed privileges, an exchange that also rnakes thern
subjects. Even so, citizens in democracies do have a different
structural relation to the government. As John A. Hayward put it
in 1885, "A subject is under subjection to a monarch, and a citizen
is under subjection to a government of which he is a component
part. ,,34 This difference restores to citizenship an aspect that
Aristotle, if not Bodin, found essential: "the knowledge and
capacity requisite for ruling as weIl as being ruled." Citizens,
Aristotle defines as, "all who share in the civic life of ruling
and being ruled in turn. ,,35
For Bodin and Hobbes the sovereign and subject-citi~ens are
distinct bodies that negotiate a mutual agreement. In a modern
representative democracy the governed and governing are not
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identical, but they are also not distinct. The relationship
between governed and governing in representative democracies opens
up various possibilities for political agency and subjectivity.
One possibility is suggested by classical liberalism. If in
Hobbes' sand Bodin' s absolutist systems the sovereign bestows
rights on individuals, in the classical liberalism of Locke people
create government to protect inalienable rights supposedly
possessed by all individuals prior to the existence of civil
society. To be designated a citizen in classical liberalism is
not, therefore, to add to one's basic rightsi it is to be called on
to participate in honoring, protecting, and preserving them.
According to Balibar, for those lodged within this tradition, "the
men of 1776 and 1789, the men of liberty and revolution, became
'citizens' because they had universally won access to subjectivity.
Better said: because they had become conscious (in a Cartesian, or
Lockean, or Kantian) way, of the fact that they were indeed free
'subjects,' always already destined to liberty (by their
'birthright' ) . ,,36 Thus, in classical liberalism possibilities for
expanding subjectivity do indeed depend on the belief that the
psychological subject precedes ideology. But there is another way
to think of citizenship in representative democracies.
In the tradition of classical republican virtue best described
by J .G.A. Pocock, rights do not precede political and civil
societYi instead, as in the thought of Hobbes and Bodin, they are
a product of it. 37 Within this tradition citizenship involves much
more than the protection of already existing rights; it is the very
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condition of having rights. Chief Justice Earl Warren articulated
this perspective when he claimed that "Citizenship is man's basic
right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights. ,,38
Classical republicans may share Bodin's and Hobbes's belief that
citizenship creates the possibility for possessing rights, but,
unlike the two absolutists, they do not conceive of a sovereign
above the people. Instead, for them sovereignty is identical with
the people. Thus, citizenship in a republic is not simply the
right to have rights, it is also the right to participate, as the
res publica (the public body) , in the construction of those rights.
If classical liberalism emphasizes the need to protect the
sanctity of private individuals, classical republicanism places
value on active citizen participation in the public sphere.
Indeed, within republicanism active citizen participation would
seem to make possible the vision of citizenship that, I will argue,
is dramatized in China Men, one that allows for the perpetual
construction and reconstruction of the conditions in which
citizens' identi ties and subj ectivities take shape. In fact,
however, more often than not classical republicanism has lent
itself to a static sense of identity rather than a dynamic one.
Classical republicanism honors the founding moment of a
republic for embodying timeless truths. One consequence is that
rights designated at the moment of foundation become fundamental
and thus as fixed as natural rights in classical liberalism.
Another consequence is that too often the sovereign people are
defined as those who founded the republic, adefinition making it
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impossible to redefine nthe people n in light of changing
circumstances. The dangers of this view are illustrated by Taney
in his Dred Scott decision, which restricted citizenship to
descendants of "the people" who participated in the original
founding of the nation. Similarly, Harlan's dissent in Wong Kim
Ark can in part be attributed to his republican beliefs. Harlan
was intent on overturning Taney's sense of the people. But he did
so by appealing to a new founding moment: the Civil War and the
amendments that reconstituted the nation. There was no place for
those of Chinese descent in that vision. In his Plessy dissent,
Harlan contrasts the Chinese, whom he labels "a race so different
from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become
citizens of the United States," with "citizens of the black race in
Louisiana, many of whom, perhaps, risked their lives for the
preservation of the Union. ,,39
Another limitation of classical republicanism is its stress on
group identity: citizens participated actively in the public
sphere, but they did so as representatives of groups (estates) that
determined who they were. This attribute of republicanism has
direct relevance to the political situation in the Uni ted States
today where people are more and more identified in terms of race.
Because race has been used to exclude various people from
citizenship, today's politics of race are understandably intent on
challenging those static aspects of classical republicanism that
rule out a perpetual redefinition of who constitutes "the people."
Even so, the emphasis on group identity can risk limiting the
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possibilities of identity as much as classical republicanism' s
identification of someone as a member of an estate.
Addressing the complicated problem of how to conceive of a
public sphere that both recognizes the dangers of confining an
individual's identity to membership in a group and the reality that
group membership plays a determinant role in shaping one's
identity, Robert Post writes, "Democratic public culture must ...
be understood as distinct from the cultures of particular groups
and communities. Even though we know that in actuality the
identities of individuals are formed through socialization into the
specific mores of specific and historical groups and communities,
the ideal of self-determination requires that public culture always
maintains the possibility of citizens imagining themselves as
something other than what in fact they are. ,,40
Just as China Men resists existing generic categories·, so it
dramatizes a way of constructing identities that defy existing
racial categories. In doing so, it generates a model for a public
culture in which citizens can imagine themselves to be other than
what they are. That possibility is enhanced in turn by active
participation in a civil sphere made up of the heterogeneous
citizenry enabled by the Court's decision in Wong Kim Ark.
Thus before turning to Kingston's work, I want to emphasize
once again Wong Kim Ark' s importance. The decision might have been
and continues to be limited; nonetheless, it provided an important
vision. Jacobsohn summarizes the effect of its refusal to allow
descent to determine citizenship: "Henceforward the ability of the
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native-born to share in the aspirational content of American
national identity was formed only by one's relation to the physical
boundaries of the United States. ,,41
In addition to affirming that vision, the case had important
practical effects. Although it did not overrule existing exclusion
acts, it did open a small but significant opportunity for those of
Chinese descent--as weIl as other excluded groups--living in the
United States. In a country with liberal naturalization laws,
distinctions between jus soli or jus sanguinis are not so
important, but the United States at the turn of the century was not
such a country. In fact, soon after the Court's decision Congress
tightened restrietions on Asian immigration. Within that context,
Wong Kim Ark countered those who wanted to restriet citizenship
according to race. Insofar as people of different races--citizens
or not--inhabited the territory under United States jurisdi6tion,
as they did, children of different bloods would most likely be born
and become automatie citizens, as indeed they have been. (Which is
why some nativists are campaigning to repeal the Fourteenth
Amendment's citizenship clause.) Dur analysis of China Men can
begin with Kingston' s account of how Chinese immigrants took
advantage of the possibilities that Wong Kim Ark opened.
v.
An important movement in this episodic book is from a chapter
entitled "The Father from China" to one called "The American
Father." Imagining how that transformation occurred, the narrator
presents three different stories. In one her father entered the
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country legallYi in another he was born in the Uni ted States and
received automatie citizenshipi in another he entered illegally.
These accounts speak to the many ways in which China Men were
Americanized. They might also seem to question the validity of
legal determinations of citizenship, since the effect of bringing
them into relation with one another is to blur the distinction
between the "legal" fathers and the "illegal" one.
The non-native born "legal" father should have been allowed to
enter even under existing exclusion acts because there was an
exception for scholars, and he had passed the Imperial Examination.
But he is warned that immigration officials will not let hirn in.
"Listen, stupid, nobody gets to be classified 'Scholar.' You can' t
speak English, you're illiterate, no scholar, no visa. 'Coolie.'
Simple test" (CM 45). Aware that immigration officials·might not
honor his legitimate examination certificate, he searches for
documents that they will honor. First, his relatives' families
"unburied their documents--visas, passports, re-entry permits,
American birth certificates, American citizenship papers" (CM 46) .
He also lets it be known that he was on the market to buy documents
from locals who are legal citizens of the United States. "These
Americans had declared the birth of a new son for every year they
had been visiting in China and thereby made slots for many 'paper
sons. ' When a Sojourner retired from going-out-on-the-road or
died, he made another slot. Somebody took his place" (CM 46). The
father, therefore, goes "with two sets of papers: bought ories and
his own, which were legal and should get hirn into the Gold Mountain
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aeeording to Ameriean law. But his own papers were untried,
whereas the fake set had aeeompanied its owners baek and forth many
times" (CM 46-47). About to faee offieers of the law who might not
reeognize an authentie doeument, the "legal" father eomes prepared
to gain entranee with fake ones.
Further blurring of legal and illegal oeeurs beeause of a
historieal aeeident. During the San Franeiseo earthquake the Hall
of Reeords burned. "Citizenship papers burned, Certifieates of
Return, Birth Certifieates, Resideney Certifieates, passenger
lists, Marriage Certifieates--every paper a China Man wanted for
eitizenship and legality burned in that fire. An authentie
eitizen, then, had no more papers than an alien. Any paper a China
Man eould not produee had been 'burned up in the fire of 1906.'
Every China Man was reborn out of that fire a eitizen" (CM 150) .
Often denied eitizenship by restrietive laws, Chinese
immigrants imaginatively used doeuments to ereate legal eitizens.
In telling her imaginative stories about her Chinese male
aneestors, Kingston follows in their tradition by repeating their
aet in the doeument that she produees. In doing so she also
appropriates the male power to name. If they ereated and adopted
"paper sons, " she ereates and adopts "paper fathers."
It is important to remember, however, that these imaginative
aets would have been impossible if it had not been for the ruling
in Wong Kim Ark. Without that ruling no one of Chinese deseent
would have been an authentie eitizen. If no one had the
possibility of beeoming a eitizen by birth, it would have been
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useless to create "paper" sons since not even "real" ones would
have been citizens. Indeed, prior to Wong Kim Ark paper documents
asserting citizenship were worthless, as shown when a grandfather
working on the transcontinental railroad is duped into buying
fraudulent citizenship papers from a "Citizenship Judge." But
after Wong Kim Ark even a child born of illegal immigrants can
receive valid papers. There is perhaps no more poignant example of
the egalitarian implications of the decision in Wong Kim Ark than
the fact that in the eyes of the law children of illegal immigrants
have the same right to citizenship as children of longstanding
citizens. Certainly, if the majority had not prevailed, Kingston
would have been forced to tell a very different story about the
transformation of the "Father from China" into "The American
Father." Indeed, the first chapter comes before the chapter on
"The Laws," while the second comes after it.
If laws played a crucial role in the father's Americanization,
they did not playa completely determining one. The acquisition of
formal citizenship is important, but, as African Americans had
learned, it does not guarantee people acceptance as "true ll
Americans. The father's transformation into "the American father"
depended on aredefinition of what makes an American as weIl as on
formal citizenship. Kingston indicates the importance of such a
redefinition by placing a chapter called "The Making of More
Americans ll between "The Laws". and "The American Father."
China Men invites a rethinking of American identity by
responding to the standard question--What makes an American?--with
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the question- -Who made America? To answer that question is to
alter the myth of the country's founding fathers by reminding us of
the material, as weIl as the political, making of the country. 42
China Men, the book shows, had an important role in the making of
America. For instance, "They built railroads in every part of the
country--the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad, the Houston and
Texas Railroad, the Southern Pacific, the railroads in Louisiana
and Boston, the Pacific Northwest, and Alaska. After the Civil
War, China Men banded the nation North and South, East and West,
with crisscrossing steel. They were the binding and building
ancestors of this place" (CH 146). Imagining a grandfather at the
ceremony celebrating the completion of the transcontinental
railroad, the narrator proclaims, "The white demon officials gave
speeches. 'The Greatest Feat of the Nineteenth Century, , they
said. 'The Greatest Feat in the History of Mankind,' they said.
'Only Americans could have done it,' they said, which is true.
Even if Ah Goong had not spent half his gold on Citizenship Papers,
he was an American for having built the railroad" (CM 145) .
Relying on questionable historiography, Taney' s exclusive
racial definition of "We, the People" had confined the term to
descendants of the whites who had participated in the original
constitution of the country. Kingston 's inclusive definition opens
the term to all who contributed to the country' s making. And since
the country is in a perpetual process of remaking, she allows for
the inclusion of new founding fathers, for the perpetual making of
more Americans. Furthermore, the role that people play in making
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America affects their relation to the land.
In Nong Kim Ark the government supported its jus sanguinis
interpretation by quoting Vattel on the international law of
citizenship: "The true bond which connects the child with the body
politic is not the matter of an inanimate piece of land, but the
moral relations of his parentage. ,,43 For Kingston, however,
the land is animated by the human labor that makes it productive.
On the island of 0' ahu in the Hawai' ian islands, the narrator
wanders into the sugar cane fields cultivated by her great
grandfather. "I have heard the land singe I have seen the bright
blue streaks of spirits whisking through the air. I again search
for my American ancestors by listening in the cane" (CM 90).
Imagining her grandfather in the fields, she details how the
laborers had not been allowed to talk while working . Her
grandfather, however, was a "talk addict" (CM 110) and needed to
express hirnself. Tricking the overseer, he led workers into the
cane where they dug a deep hole and yelled into it.
They had dug an ear into the world, and were telling
the earth their secrets.
"I want horne," Bak Goong yelled, pressed against the
soil, and smelling the earth. "I want my horne," the rnen
yelled together. "I want my horne. Horne. Horne. Horne.
Horne."
Talked out, they buried their words, planted thern
(CM 118).
Listening to the cane years later, Kingston imagines the lives of
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the workers who cultivated the land. "Soon the new green shoots
would rise, and when in two years the cane grew gold tasseIs, what
stories the wind would tell" (CM 118). lf Locke feIt that human
labor making the land productive gave someone possession of the
land, Kingston suggests that workers' labor gives them a claim to
belong to the land.
When Kau Goong, the narrator's great uncle, is urged to go to
Hong Kong to reunite with his wife who has smuggled herself out of
the People's Republic in order to be with hirn, he eventually.balks.
U'l've decided to stay in California.' He said, 'California. This
is my horne. I belong here.' He turned and, looking at us, roared,
'We belong here.'" (CM 184). Anticipating the title of one of the
best books arguing for inclusive American ci tizenship- -Belonging to
America--Kau Goong stakes his claim to a new home. 44
Kau Gong's affirmation that he belongs in California is an
important part of the process in which those who are formally
citizens are recognized by themselves and others as Americans. His
roaring, "We belong here," signals Kingston's recognition of the
pull of a diasporic identity.
Diaspora derives from the Greek word speirein, which means to
sow or scatter. Meaning dispersion, it also suggests the need to
take root after sowing. lndeed, at the end of his chapter, "the
American father" finally owns ahorne and plants "trees that will
take years to fruit" (CM 255). But if Kingston recognizes the need
for groups to establish roots in a new land, she also knows that
the United States is made up of numerous diasporic communities and
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that no group's identity remains the same in its new horne. Acutely
aware of how individual identity is shaped by one' s cultural
heritage, Kingston does not consider it ultimately determinant. On
the contrary, for her, identity is fashioned as much by where one
lives and with whom one interacts as by where one comes from. For
instance, the narrator's brother "returns" to a China where he has
never been (which is in fact Hong Kong) with expectations of
encountering a culture that will make hirn feel at horne. Instead,
like many before hirn, he is made aware of his "Americanness" (CM
294). At the same time, Kingston plays with our notion of what is
"authentically" Chinese by including a "black Chinese Red
Communists" (CM 86), the narrator's black cousin and uncle living
in the People's Republic.
Kingston's destabilization of identities suggests her kinship
with champions of what has come to be called border identity,
although, as we will see, there is a crucial difference. A hybrid
identity constituted by the multiple subjectivities that people
have from occupying spaces between different cultures, border
identity challenges the seeming arbitrariness of national
boundaries--and thus national citizenship--in an increasingly
mobile global society. If the concept of citizenship is to be
preserved at all, it would seem to require redefinition in terms of
different geographie units such as cities or in terms of multiple
or at least dual nationalities. 45
In Wong Kim Ark an argument against adopting a jus soli policy
for the Uni ted States while much of the world retained jus
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sanguinis was that doing so created possibilities for dual
citizenship. Commenting on Wong Kim Ark, the Harvard Law Review
concluded, "This difficulty, however, is more apparent than real.
When a child is born in America of Chinese parents, China claims
hirn by jus sanguinis, America by jus soli. It is not a question
whether he is an American or a Chinamanj he is both. . The
duality of citizenship is a fact only in a third country. In
China, he is a Chinamanj in America, an American. ,,46
The title page of Kingston's book might seem to endorse this
conclusion. In addition to the English title of China Men,
Kingston includes the Chinese written character for "Gold Mountain
Warriors," the name adopted by Chinese journeying to California,
which was known as the Gold Mountain. 47 Even so, these two titles
have a significantly different effect from what the Harvard Law
Review concludes about Wong Kim Ark's status. The title in Chinese
identifies the book' s protagonists with the United Statesj the
title in English with China. Rather than belonging to both America
and China, the book's protagonists might seem to belong to neither.
Yet Kingston is very clear that those of Chinese descent living in
the United States have full claim to United States citizenship.
Redefining what it means to be an American without abandoning
the term itself, Kingston distances herself from at least some
border theorists. If she recognizes the existence of multiple
subjectivities and ties to multiple identities, she also counters
border theorists' romance with displacement with an awareness of
how important a sense of belonging is for people occupying aland
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with others. Active citizenship fosters that sense of belonging. 48
Even so, to belong to America in Kingston's world is not to have a
set identity. It is instead to have the opportunity to participate
in a process of reconstructing one's identity that interaction with
numerous groups makes possible. If similar interactions take place
elsewhere, none is exactly the same as the one taking place within
the territorial limits of the United States. In suggesting a model
for that interaction, Kingston makes her contribution to the vision
affirmed in Wong Kim Ark when the Court refused to base citizenship
by birth on descent.
Kingston 's dynamic model of citizenship brings us to a topic
that links literary and political concerns: representation. Within
the American literary tradition the most prominent attempt to
represent the interaction of a diverse citizenry is Walt Whitman's
embrace of it through an expansion of the self. But this expansion
depends on the synecdochic ability of apart to represent the
whole, as Whi tman takes on the task of speaking for others,
especially those who have often been silenced. China Men formally
embodies a subtly different strategy of representing how persons
within a given territory interact with and affect one another. 49
Unlike Whitman's "I," Kingston's narrator makes no claim to
speak for who she is not, although she does continually imagine who
she is not, especially when she takes on the difficult task of
telling the story of China Men. In order to accomplish that task
she goes to the closest source that she has, her father, and tries
to get hirn to speak. But he is silent about his past. Her
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response is: "I'll tell you what I suppose from your silences and
few words, and you can tell me that I'm mistaken. You'll just have
to speak up with the real stories if I've got you wrang" (CM 15) .
Similarly, Kingston invites her readers to speak up and tell their
stories if she's gotten the account of Americanization'wrong.
Kingston offers a self-consciously fictionalized narrative,
whose function is to provoke diverse voices to speak for themselves
rather than to speak for them. Not a naive celebration of identity
politics, the formal structure of the book stresses a common life
that can be created by the dialogue of different voices without
effacing their differences. so That dialogic structure is
emphasized by the book's first and last chapters. The first is
entitled "On Discovery"j the last "On Listening." Discovery in
Kingston I s world comes not only from speaking one I s voice and
representing one's interests, but, equally important, from
listening to others. This dynamic process of provoking new voices
into a civic dialogue of listening and speaking opens up
possibilities for perpetually redefining both the constitution of
the body politic and the identities of the individuals it embodies.
If to be an American citizen means subjecting oneself to the
country's laws, Kingston imagines how citizen participation in a
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